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Key points 
Investment has declined in the euro area since the start of the economic and financial crisis.  But 
this does not mean that there is necessarily an ‘investment gap’. Investment was probably above a 
sustainable level due to the credit boom before 2007. Moreover, the fall in the euro area’s potential 
growth (due to a combination of a sharp demographic slowdown and lower total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth) should also lead to a permanently lower investment rate. Increasing 
the investment rate might thus be the wrong target for economic policy. 
 
Recommendation 
The aim of economic policy should be to increase consumption, rather than investment overall. 
Increasing infrastructure investment might be justified in some member countries, but it is not a 
‘free lunch’ when efficiency levels are low, which seems to be the case in some of the financially 
stressed euro area countries.  
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he mantra in Brussels and all over Europe 
is that investment holds the key to 
recovery in the euro area. A central 
element of the new Commission’s economic 
strategy is a proposed programme of investment 
of €300 billion. The emphasis on investment is 
not new,1 but has grown in strength as the euro 
area seems stuck in a never-ending recession. 
The general message that growth-enhancing 
investment is crucial for a sustainable recovery 
is also prominent in the public debate in many 
member countries, with the emphasis on how to 
boost investment − in particular public 
investment, in the case of Germany.  
The underlying assumption of this emphasis is 
that ‘more is always better’, i.e. that more 
investment is always desirable because it 
increases capital stock and thus output. 
However, the problem with relying on 
investment in re-starting growth is that it might 
provide at most a temporary boost since the 
capital that has been built up today will not 
need to rebuilt tomorrow. This means that 
boosting investment might increase demand 
today, but at the expense of demand tomorrow.    
The IMF has recently published an in-depth 
analysis of the benefits of infrastructure 
investment, which has widely been read as 
implying that infrastructure investment is a ‘no 
brainer’. A careful reading of the results of the 
IMF shows, however, that this is not the case 
everywhere. 
We start by taking a brief look at the longer term 
economics of overall investment. The one issue 
                                                     
1 See, for example, the general recommendations of the 
European Council to the euro area earlier this year: 
“Investment in the euro area fell strongly in the initial 
phase of the crisis and has not yet recovered to its long-
term average. Sluggish investment trends are being driven 
by the combined impact of private sector deleveraging, 
financial fragmentation, and necessary fiscal consolidation 
efforts, which have led to a reduction in public investment. 
Increasing investment in infrastructure and skills is 
essential to sustain the recovery and boost potential 
growth. Much of the investment must come from the 
private sector, but public authorities can play an important 
role in creating supporting conditions” (see 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST
%2010808%202014%20INIT). 
not addressed in this note is what policy 
measures could actually have an impact on 
investment in the short run.  
There is a huge literature on the determinants of 
investment, which has generally come to the 
conclusion that the key variable is growth (or 
expectations of growth) and that interest rates 
play at best a secondary role. One immediate 
implication of this, of course, is that monetary 
policy is unlikely to have a strong impact on 
investment. 
1. Where is the investment gap for 
the euro area? 
Superficially, higher investment seems always 
desirable. But the argument that Europe needs 
more investment now because its investment 
rate is currently lower than before the crisis is 
wrong on two accounts.  
1.1 Investment in the financial cycle 
First, it is ‘natural’ that during a credit boom 
investment is high, possibly higher than 
warranted ex post, because of the easy 
availability of credit during the boom. 
Moreover, the experience of some countries 
proves that excessive investment in the wrong 
sectors (e.g. housing) will do little to create 
conditions for sustainable growth. Likewise, it is 
natural that during the bust investment falls 
significantly (possibly undershooting the 
equilibrium level) and then stabilises at a level 
that is lower than during the boom. It is thus not 
surprising that today’s investment rate is lower 
than during the credit boom up to 2008. 
Figure 1, below, shows the investment of the 
three main sectors as a % of GDP for the euro 
area. The overall investment rate is now only 
17.4% of GDP, compared to over 22% at the 
peak of the boom in 2007, equivalent to a fall of 
over 4.5% of GDP (or €450 billion per annum). 
This is the basis for the argument that what is 
needed now is a recovery of investment. The 
chart also shows that public sector investment 
only plays a small role.  In relative terms it fell 
by about the same percentage (-20%) as 
investment of the corporate and household 
T 
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sector, but in absolute terms the contribution of 
public sector investment was only one-half of 
one percentage point as it fell from 2.5% of GDP 
to 2% of GDP. 
Figure 1. Euro area: Investment by sector, % of GDP 
 
Source: Own calculations on AMECO data, HH= households, GG=general government and C= corporate sector. 
The euro area had also experienced a fall 
investment during 2001-02, which followed the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble of 1999-2000. But 
the present fall seems to be larger, maybe due to 
the ‘double whammy’ of the global financial 
crisis of 2009 and then the euro crisis, with its 
peak in 20012-13. One should keep in mind that 
the recovery of investment after 2002 must have 
been helped by the global credit boom. The real 
question is thus not whether investment should 
be expected to recover to its peak of 22% of 
GDP, but the more normal level of 20% of GDP 
before the global credit boom took off. 
1.2 Investment and demographics 
This leads to the second factor that might be 
holding back investment: a development that 
has little to do with the financial or euro crisis 
but by chance comes at the same time. (There is 
actually some evidence that large financial crises 
coincide with demographic turning points.)2 
                                                     
2 See Daniel Gros et al. (2013), “The Global Economy in 
2030: Trends and Strategies for Europe” 
(http://www.ceps.eu/book/global-economy-2030-trends-
and-strategies-europe-0). 
What is rarely recognised for Europe is how 
quickly demographic trends have turned 
recently, implying a significantly lower 
potential growth rate, which in turn implies that 
a lower (equilibrium) investment-to-GDP ratio 
is needed to keep the capital/output ratio 
constant. As shown in Box 1, ceteris paribus, the 
equilibrium ratio of investment to GDP (i.e. the 
ratio that keeps the capital output ratio constant) 
falls if potential GDP falls. Put simply: as the 
growth rate of the working-age population falls 
so does, ceteris paribus (assuming that TFP and 
other factors to not change), the potential 
growth rate of the economy. This implies, in 
turn, that a lower investment rate (investment as 
a share of GDP) is required to maintain a 
constant level of the capital-to-output ratio. If 
population growth falls but investment rates 
remain high the capital output rate would 
increase and the return to investment would 
fall. The lower return to capital would then lead 
over time to more non-performing loans in the 
banking sector. 
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Box 1. Steady-state capital-output ratios and equilibrium investment-to-GDP ratios  
The rate of capital accumulation is determined by two key variables: investment and growth rates (and 
depreciation). The evolution of the capital output ratio (which describes the process of capital accumulation) can be 
calculated from these two variables. The so-called ‘law of motion of the capital-to-output ratio’ is given by the 
following equation: 
  
  
  
      
   
  
     
   
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Where I denote gross investment, g the growth rate of GDP and, in the last part of the equation, it is assumed that 
capital depreciates at a rate denoted by       . 
The time change of the capital-to-output ratio can thus be written as a function of the investment rate I/Y and the 
present capital output ratio: 
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
      
  
  
 
 
This implies that one can compute the capital-output ratio at the steady state as a simple ratio: 
   
  
 
  
 
  
  
     
 
And that the ratio of investment to GDP that keeps the K/Y ratio constant is given by:  
  
  
  
 
  
       
  
  
 
  
 
Where the subscript ss denotes steady state variables. 
Given that K/Y for the euro area is close to 2.5, assuming a fall in growth from 2% to 1% would imply a fall in the 
steady state investment rate from 20% to 17.5%. 
A higher capital stock should lead to higher output. If one takes this consideration into account the link between 
growth and the investment rate will be affected by the ICOR (incremental capital output ratio) or more generally 
the marginal productivity of capital. A simple linear relationship, which might be useful in local approximation, 
would be to posit that output growth is a function of the capital stock and a remainder that conflates TFP and 
population growth: 
       
This implies that the first equation can be rewritten as: 
  
  
  
     
  
  
 
       
  
  
  
 
  
  
     
  
  
        
  
  
 
Where I denotes as before gross Investment and g now represents no longer overall GDP growth, but the sum of 
TFP and population growth (the other exogenous growth factors). 
The investment rate which will keep the output ratio constant will thus be given by: 
  
  
  
 
  
        
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
 
Where the subscript ss again denotes steady-state variables. A higher value of φ, i.e. a higher ICOR will increase 
the steady-state investment rate because for any given investment rate is increases the growth rate of GDP. 
If it were possible to increase the ICOR by some policy measures one could thus justify a lasting increase in the 
investment rate. The problem is that it is difficult to find any policy measure that would have this impact. The 
‘capital market union’ proposed by the president of the European Commission might have, inter alia, this goal, but 
this can certainly not be achieved in the short run. 
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The numbers are stark for the euro area. Its 
working-age population growth (aged 20-59) is 
projected to fall on average by about 1.1% (p.a.) 
with a peak of 2.6% (!) for Spain. Moreover, if 
TFP also falls the overall fall in potential growth 
could be much more than one full percentage 
point. TFP growth has fallen considerably in the 
euro area and is now even negative. Part of this 
might be due to the lingering effects of the 
financial crisis, but even if only part of the fall in 
TFP growth is permanent, say 0.4% per annum, 
this would imply a fall in the potential growth 
rate of 1-1.4% per year (e.g. from 2.4% 
previously to 1-1.4% now).  
This would then lead to a fall in the steady-state 
sustainable investment ratio of about 2.5 to 3.5 
(percentage points of GDP). A fall in the 
investment rate from 19.5 to 17% of GDP (the 
lower bound) implies a permanent fall in 
investment of about 12-13%. Given that the 
investment rate during the credit boom was 
probably in excess of the steady state one has to 
conclude that much of the fall in investment (not 
only in construction) after 2008-09 will be 
permanent. 
Moreover, if one compares the euro area to the 
US one finds that Europe is already more capital 
intensive; and that the difference with the US is 
increasing (see Figure 2, below).  
The higher investment rate in the US is justified 
by its much higher growth rate (both because of 
demographics and productivity growth). Higher 
investment in Europe would only lead to even 
higher capital-output ratios and imply lower 
returns to capital (with, in the end, more non-
performing loans in the banking sector). 
Table 1. Falling working-age population 
Growth rate working age population 
 
 
2000-2005 2015-2020 
Annual 
change 
EA4 3.2 -2.4 -1.1 
Individual 
countries    
UK 2.7 0.5 -0.4 
Japan -1.9 -2.8 -0.2 
US 5.2 0.5 -0.9 
IT 2.5 -2.3 -0.9 
ES 10.5 -2.6 -2.6 
DE -0.6 -4.2 -0.7 
F 4.3 0.1 -0.8 
Note: Working age is defined as 20-59 years. 
Source: Own calculations based on UN data. 
Figure 2. Comparing capital-output ratio estimates, euro area and the US 
 
Note: Capital is assumed to depreciate at 6% per year. Output is measured as potential GDP (based on IMF data). 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based Ameco and IMF data. 
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This figure relates the (estimated) capital stock 
to potential (not actual) GDP because a recession 
with an output gap might distort the 
capital/output ratio. The comparison takes into 
account that the output gap is still higher in the 
euro area than in the US. 
The data up to 2018 are, obviously, only 
projections. But they indicate that even with a 
rather modest recovery in investment the 
capital/output ratio of the euro area will 
continue to increase, implying that the return to 
capital would continue to fall. 
1.3 Growth enhancing investment 
There are, of course, forms of investment that 
are more conducive to high returns and 
sustainable growth. The best known instance is 
investment in research and development (R&D), 
which has long been recognised by economists 
as having the characteristics of fixed assets. In a 
modern economy, R&D is an even more 
important investment for the future than 
buildings, trucks, or factories. However, 
although R&D is thought to be the major 
contribution to future economic growth 
(allowing for growth in TFP), R&D expenditure, 
− whether conducted on own account or 
purchased − was recorded as “intermediate 
consumption”, meaning that it was recorded as 
“completely used in the production process” at 
the end of the period. As a result, the balance 
sheet of the economy was understated, as well 
as GDP and operating profits. Indeed, being 
considered an expense consumed at the end of 
the period, R&D expenditures came in 
deduction of the global output of the economy 
and of operating profits of the period. In new 
accounting, R&D outputs are recognised as 
assets and the acquisition, disposal and 
depreciation of R&D fixed assets will be treated 
in the same way as other fixed assets. The most 
immediate and visible impact for users will be 
that the level of GDP will be increased for all 
countries, to an amount depending on their 
investment in R&D. According to preliminary 
estimates the level of GDP will be boosted by 
1.9% in Europe (weighted average of member 
states) and the investment to GDP will increase 
correspondingly. But since R&D spending has 
not changed much as a share of GDP in recent 
years this change in national-income accounting 
will not affect the basic conclusions drawn here.  
But the basic fact remains that ‘classic’, ‘tangible’ 
investment, at about 17% of GDP, remains much 
more important than R&D (less than 3% of 
GDP). Moreover, as shown in Figure 3 below, 
most of the fall in the measured investment-to- 
GDP ratio since 2007-8 was due to construction 
investment, which fell by 2.9 percentage points 
of GDP (between 2008 and 2013) whereas the 
fall in investment in equipment (which is more 
relevant for future production) fell by ‘only’ 1.4 
percentage points of GDP. 
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Figure 3. Investment as % of GDP in the euro area 
 
Source: Ameco. 
2. Is infrastructure investment a ‘no 
brainer’? 
The October 2014 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) of the IMF contains a special chapter on 
public investment in infrastructure. The main 
thrust of the analysis is that infrastructure 
investment increases output (over time) so that 
even a debt-financed increase in expenditure 
lowers the debt/GDP ratio. This is because the 
increase in GDP is large enough to offset the 
higher debt needed to finance the investment 
itself. However, the analysis also shows that this 
is the case only for countries classified as ‘high 
efficiency’, i.e. countries in which over the past, 
higher infrastructure investment has translated 
into a better quality infrastructure (as measured 
by a World Economic Forum (WEF) indicator). 
For ‘low efficiency’ countries the opposite holds: 
higher infrastructure spending leads to an 
output path below the baseline. This is 
explained by the fact that infrastructure 
investment in low efficiency countries is 
basically just wasted. The other result is that for 
such countries higher spending on 
infrastructure leads to a sharp increase in the 
debt/GDP ratio.  
The prescription to increase infrastructure 
spending is thus valid only for high efficiency 
countries. In the concrete case of the euro area 
one finds that France, Germany and Spain are 
classified as ‘high efficiency’. However, Italy, 
Greece and Slovakia are low efficiency and 
should thus not be asked to increase spending. 
As one would expect, there is also a clear 
correlation between the WEF indicator of (the 
absence of) corruption and the quality of 
infrastructure, again of the WEF. 
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Figure 4. Quality of investment, selected euro area countries  
 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness indicator. 
Figure 5. Relationship between (inverse measure of) corruption and quality of infrastructure 
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum database. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Calling for more investment is superficially 
always attractive. However, there are 
fundamental reasons to believe that the 
investment rate in the euro area will remain 
permanently depressed. The investment gap so 
often invoked is anyway much smaller than 
widely believed because any comparison with 
the peak level reached at the peak of a credit 
boom in 2007 is inappropriate. But investment 
rates in the euro area are likely to remain below 
the more normal levels of before the credit boom 
because the potential growth rate of the euro 
area has declined so much under the twin 
impacts of lower labour force growth (now 
turning negative) and a fall in overall 
productivity (a longer term trend whose root 
cause is difficult to ascertain). 
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It might be possible, through certain policy 
measures, to bring some investment plans 
forward, but this would come at the expense of 
lower investment in the future if the capital 
stock is to remain appropriate to the level of 
output that can be expected in a low-growth 
environment. Moreover, the experience in 
countries with relatively high investment rates, 
but low growth, such as Italy, has shown that 
keeping investment up when potential growth 
remains anaemic leads, over time, to the 
accumulation of non-performing loans in the 
banking sector.  
The facile counterargument is that investment in 
southern Europe, including Italy, was ‘mal 
invested’ during the boom years, implying that 
Italy and other financially stressed countries 
might have relatively high stock of capital, but 
of the wrong type (housing and other non-
tradable activities) and that high investment is 
needed to give the economies of the South the 
capital needed for a new type of growth.  
However, it is unlikely that a higher rate of 
investment in countries like Italy will lead to a 
much higher productivity today (i.e. a higher 
incremental capital output ratio − ICOR) unless 
the financial system is radically changed.  
Authors Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) 
show how ‘lazy banks’ that place too much 
emphasis on collateral might not screen 
investment projects for their profitability. An 
excessive emphasis on collateral might have 
been at the root of the low productivity of 
investment in Italy. There is no indication that 
this has changed recently. If anything, banks 
might now have become even more prudent. 
The conclusion is that European policy-makers 
should focus on increasing consumption, rather 
than harping on about more investment. The 
recoveries in the US and the UK have indeed 
been largely driven by consumption, which has 
recovered in the US on the back of stronger 
household balance sheets. A recovery in 
investment has followed a resumed growth in 
consumption. 
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Annex 1. Extract from the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, October 2014 
Figure 6. Effect of public investment in advanced economies: Role of economic conditions, efficiency, and mode of 
financing 
 
Note: t = 0 is the year of the shock; dashed lines denote 90 confidence bands. Solid yellow lines represent the baseline 
result.  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014, p. 84. 
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Figure 7. Model simulation results. Effect of public investment shocks on output: high versus low efficiency  
 
Note: t = 0 is the year of the shock; dashed lines denote 90% confidence bands. Blue lines represent high efficiency; red 
lines represent low efficiency; yellow lines represent the baseline. Shock represents an exogenous 1 percentage point of 
GDP increase in public investment spending. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014, p. 96. 
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Annex 2. Capital output ratios in two key euro area countries vs the US 
It is interesting to consider the capital output ratios of two key countries: Germany and Italy. The 
German capital output ratio used to be much higher than that of Italy, but it started to decline around 
the start of EMU, leading to much handwringing about the future of Germany as an industrial economy. 
The decline accelerated with the (German only) recession in 2003, around the same time the public state 
guarantee for the Landesbanken/Sparkassen system was terminated under pressure from the European 
Commission (Commissioner responsible Mario Monti). This decline in the German investment rate was 
one of the contributing factors to the emergence of the German current account surplus. 
In Italy, by contrast, investment stayed relatively high until 2010, leading to a steady increase in the 
capital output ratio given the low growth rate of the country. This trend has continued more recently 
(and is projected by the IMF to continue) because a slightly lower investment rate has been more than 
compensated by an even lower growth rate. This figure also relates the (estimated) capital stock to 
potential GDP. The comparison between Germany and Italy is thus distorted by the fact that Italy has a 
very large output gap. 
Figure 8. Capital output ratios 
 
Note: Capital is assumed to depreciate at 6% per year. Output is measured as potential GDP (based on IMF data). 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based Ameco and IMF data. 
That relatively poor countries can have higher capital output ratios is not a phenomenon only of the 
Eurozone. For example, the capital output ratio of China is much higher than that of the US. This implies 
that the (average) productivity of capital is higher in the US than in China. It thus makes sense that 
capital flows from China to the US and not vice versa as observed by Gros (2013). A similar observation 
applies to the euro area where it is generally assumed that capital should flow from the North 
(Germany) to the South (Italy, Spain, etc.). However, with the German capital output ratio now much 
lower than that of Italy this is not necessarily the case. 
 
